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Abstract
This study develops a computable general equilibrium model for Nigeria to study
the impact of fossil fuel subsidy reform – and energy taxes – on key economic
parameters, including consumption, income distribution, tax incidence, and fis-
cal efficiency. The model also examines the role of informality, tax evasion, and
fuel smuggling, and shows that these factors can substantially strengthen the
argument in favour of subsidy reform. The study shows that redistributing rev-
enues from subsidy reform using uniform cash transfers has a strong progressive
(i.e. pro-poor) distributional effect. Moreover, redistributing reform revenues
by cutting pre-existing labour taxes not only increases fiscal efficiency, but also
reduces the welfare losses associated with tax evasion, which in turn reduces
the welfare costs of reform by up to 40%. Regardless of the method of revenue
redistribution, reducing subsidies diminishes the incentives for fuel smuggling,
and hence the welfare losses associated with it.
Keywords: Fossil fuel subsidies, reform, tax evasion, smuggling
1. Introduction
Global subsidies to fossil fuel consumption amounted to $493 B in 2014 (IEA,
2015) – i.e. exceeding the climate finance commitment of $100 B agreed un-
der the Paris Agreement by a factor five. However, the true economic and
societal cost is bound to be far higher than this figure, since fossil fuel subsi-
dies (FFS) cause countless adverse effects, including the lock-in of inefficient
technology and behaviour, crowding out of funds for public spending such as
education and health care, an erosion of competitiveness, exacerbating envi-
ronmental pressures, and regressive wealth transfer to the rich (Rentschler and
Bazilian, 2016). In addition to these adverse effects, FFS are also frequently
∗Corresponding author
Email address: jun.rentschler.10@ucl.ac.uk (Jun E. Rentschler)
GRIPS Discussion Paper July 3, 2017
argued to be associated with illicit activities, including corruption, fuel smug-
gling, and tax evasion. However, no systematic study exists exploring the role
of such activities in determining the outcomes FFS reforms.
Against this background, this study develops a dedicated computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model to provide estimates of the orders of magnitude of
the tax evasion and smuggling effects associated with FFS reform. More specif-
ically, this study addresses the following interrelated questions: (i) What are
the effects of FFS reform on key economic parameters, including income distri-
bution, consumption, and output? (ii) How do effects differ when illicit market
activities are taken into account, in particular tax evasion and rampant fuel
smuggling? (iii) How do effects differ when FFS are not only removed, but re-
placed by fuel taxes? (iv) How do different methods of revenue re-distribution
affect households?
To address these questions, this study develops a small open economy gen-
eral equilibrium model, calibrated to reflect the characteristics of Nigeria. The
model features six representative households (reflecting income quintiles and a
smuggling household), a government which collects taxes, consumes, and pro-
vides cash transfers and fossil fuel subsidies, as well as four economic sectors.
While building on the standard model outlined by Hosoe et al. (2010), this
study introduces several innovative model features which distinguish this model
from previous analyses (e.g. Plante, 2014). In particular, it introduces a large
informal sector, evasion of labour and production taxes, and fuel smuggling.
Overall, the study presented in this discussion paper finds that replacing FFS
with cash transfers results in substantial progressive redistribution. While the
top income quintile incurs a reduction in consumption, all other income quin-
tiles gain, with the poorest income quintile benefitting from the largest relative
consumption increase. Moreover, using revenues from FFS reform to cut labour
taxes results in an improvement of fiscal efficiency. Crucially, this study finds
that taking into account illicit activities can lower the social welfare costs of
FFS reform by up to 40%. Moreover, by going beyond FFS reform and also
considering the introduction of fuel taxes, this study finds that the above men-
tioned benefits can be extended further: A revenue neutral shift of the tax base
from income to fuel taxes can significantly reduce illicit activities and their as-
sociated welfare costs. However, this move may also incentivise a reversal of the
fuel smuggling direction from out- to inbound.
2. Relation to prior literature
2.1. Fossil fuel subsidies
A large body of literature and numerous case studies have helped to document
the adverse effects of FFS. Often used as a political tool, FFS have been jus-
tified by objectives such as alleviating poverty, redistributing natural resource
revenues to citizens, and promoting industrialization and economic development
(Strand, 2013).
However, the evidence is very clear in showing that FFS are a very ineffective
way of achieving these objectives, and cause a wide range of adverse side effects
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pertaining to all dimensions of sustainable development: economic, social, and
environmental (Rentschler and Bazilian, 2016). These side effects include eco-
nomic and technological inefficiency, fiscal imbalances, crowding out of public
funds for innovation and social services, pollution, climate change, fuel smug-
gling, and corruption (IMF, 2013; Coady et al., 2015b,a; ADB, 2015).
In addition to the fiscal pressure they place on national budgets, FFS are also
particularly problematic because of their highly regressive nature. In reviewing
FFS schemes in a range of developing countries, Arze del Granado et al. (2012)
found that the top income quintile receives on average six times more in absolute
subsidy benefits than the poorest income quintile. In this way, FFS continuously
reinforce and exacerbate existing patterns of income and wealth inequality. A
comprehensive overview of FFS definitions, adverse side effects, reform progress
and barriers is provided by Rentschler and Bazilian (2016).
In light of mounting evidence in favour of FFS reform, the key question for policy
makers has been how to design and implement reforms in a way that ensures
public support for reform and protects livelihoods of vulnerable households.
2.2. Fossil fuel subsidy reform simulations
Econometric reform simulations typically focus on changes in household con-
sumption, and are useful for understanding the welfare and distribution effects
of FFS reform. Various such empirical ex-ante impact assessments of FFS re-
forms have been conducted to provide useful guidance for policy makers seeking
to estimate reform impacts. For example, several studies – including IMF work-
ing papers – provide econometric analyses of the welfare impacts of FFS reforms,
and highlight the need to provide adequate social protection (e.g., in the form
of cash compensation) along with FFS reform (Anand et al., 2013; Araar et al.,
2015; Zhang, 2011; Coady et al., 2010; Verme and El-Massnaoui, 2015).1
Both the IMF and World Bank provide analytical toolkits for the empirical sim-
ulation of FFS reforms using household expenditure surveys and input-output
models (Verme and El-Massnaoui, 2015; IMF, 2016). The approach taken by
these models enables swift and consistent analyses with relatively few data re-
quirements.
However, as Plante (2014) points out, these models also strongly simplify com-
plex interactions, as they overlook the fiscal policy and general equilibrium
perspective on subsidies: These models focus exclusively on the fact that the
removal of FFS leads to energy price shocks, which in turn reduce purchasing
power and aggregate consumption of households. Thus, FFS removal necessar-
ily and exclusively has negative consequences, while benefits such as reduced
deadweight losses or increased economic efficiency are not taken into account.
Similarly, general equilibrium effects on key macro-economic parameters can-
not be captured in models based on household surveys, including changes in
government expenditure, output, and tax revenues.
1For additional empirical impact assessments of FFS reforms, see Jiang et al. (2015) and
Ouyang and Lin (2014) for China, and Solaymani and Kari (2014) for Malaysia.
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To address the above mentioned shortcomings, Plante (2014) developed a gen-
eral equilibrium model aimed at capturing the fiscal policy aspect of FFS re-
form. It is a standard small open economy model with two sectors, and a
single representative household. FFS reductions are balanced in the govern-
ment’s budget constraint through tax adjustments or lump-sum cash transfer
provision. Using this model, it is shown that FFS cause distortions of relative
prices, which are identified as the main reason for substantial aggregate welfare
losses. Moreover, FFS are shown to aggravate fiscal imbalances, crowd out non-
energy consumption, and cause inefficient allocation of labour across sectors,
regardless of whether the country is an oil importer or exporter (Plante, 2014).
The model also suggests that permanent cash transfers can be an efficient and
equitable tool for redistributing resource revenues, consistent with overarching
development objectives of reducing poverty and inequality.
At least two other general equilibrium models have followed: Durand-Lasserve
et al. (2015) offer an analysis for Indonesia based on the OECD’s ENV-Linkages
model, a global CGE model. This study focusses in particular on distributional
effects of FFS reform, considering redistribution of reform revenues through
cash transfers or food subsidies. Siddig et al. (2014) use the CGE model by the
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) to analyse subsidy reform in Nigeria.
They distinguish twelve households, each representing a region rather than an
income group. Using this set-up they consider the impact of FFS reform on
several standard macro-economic parameters, such as consumption and GDP.
While the above mentioned models differ in the complexity of their modelling
set-ups, they coincide in their focus on key macro-economic parameters, in par-
ticular output, consumption, trade and fiscal balances, and income distribution.
Hence, these studies must also be seen in the broader context of – not only FFS
reform – but the environmental taxation literature.
In particular, there is a prominent strand in this literature suggesting that there
is a “double dividend” – i.e., that if environmental taxes are increased, but other
distortionary taxes are reduced (while maintaining revenue neutrality), then
not only can environmental benefits be reaped, but also fiscal efficiency can
be increased (Goulder, 1995a; Fullerton and Metcalf, 1997; Bovenberg, 1999).
However, Parry and Williams (2010) also show that there is a considerable trade-
off between efficiency and distributional effects. That is, income tax reductions
are economically efficient, but regressive, while cash transfers are progressive,
but less efficient. Since FFS are (at least theoretically) equivalent to a negative
carbon tax, this study gives thorough consideration to the double dividend
argument in the context of FFS reforms.
2.3. Tax evasion and smuggling
More recent studies have contributed an additional perspective, which signif-
icantly strengthened the double dividend argument. Liu (2013) observes that
energy (or carbon) taxes are more difficult to evade than labour or income taxes.
Using a simple CGE model, the author shows that a revenue neutral shift from
labour to carbon taxes can substantially reduce tax evasion and the welfare cost
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of climate change mitigation policy.2 Especially when pre-existing tax evasion
is high, this argument can significantly strengthen both the environmental and
fiscal case for carbon taxes (Kuralbayeva, 2013; Liu, 2013; Bento et al., 2013;
Carson et al., 2014; Vasilev, 2016).
Even though tax evasion tends to be particularly high in developing countries
– large informal sectors are symptomatic for this – the “tax evasion effect”
has not been studied in the context of FFS reform. Similarly, despite being a
frequently cited side-effect of fossil fuel subsidies, smuggling has also received
little attention from researchers (Mlachila et al., 2016; Rentschler and Bazilian,
2016). As subsidised fuels are smuggled out of a country, the government is
directly subsidising fuel consumption in neighbouring countries; in other words
public funds intended for domestic beneficiaries are continuously leaking out of
the country (ADB, 2015). Mlachila et al. (2016) offer one of the few studies
that systematically analyse the magnitude and implications of fuel subsidies on
smuggling activities. They show that fuel smuggling can severely undermine
the effectiveness of fuel price adjustment mechanisms and energy tax collection,
when neighbouring countries subsidise their domestic fuel consumption.
The model presented in this study contributes to the literature on FFS reform
and the double dividend, by providing a systematic account of tax evasion, the
informal sector, and fuel smuggling in the case of Nigeria. These issues are of
great significance in developing countries, especially when considering that the
informal economy in Nigeria is estimated at 50% of GDP, and that 85% of fuel
consumed in Benin is smuggled from (and thus subsidised by) Nigeria (Mlachila
et al., 2016; Hassan and Schneider, 2016).
3. The societal cost of illicit activities
A key assumption by Liu (2013) is that tax evasion (and legal tax avoidance)
activities incur real cost. The reason for this is that tax evasion efforts require
real resources, and thus compete for production factors with real productive
activities (ADB, 2015). Bribes paid to tax officials, the employment of tax
lawyers and advisors, or the complex shifting of profits between international
subsidiaries are examples of costly tax avoidance or evasion activities. In ad-
dition, taxes may reduce economic efficiency by distorting business decisions
and production processes. In practice, the increased need for fiscal audits and
monitoring may also impose a costly burden on authorities. Overall, tax evasion
imposes real costs on society, not only because productive resources are allocated
to unproductive evasion activity, but also because of foregone tax revenues.
Analogously, fuel smuggling activities also represent a loss to society. Fuel sub-
sidies that are intended for the benefit of a country’s own citizens are smuggled
abroad; in other words, the government is directly subsidising the energy con-
sumption for foreign consumers. In addition, the smuggling activity itself is
costly, as significant resources are used on transporting fuel, and avoiding and
bribing border and customs controls (Mlachila et al., 2016). As in the case of tax
2Liu (2013) shows that costs can be lowered by 89% in China and 97% in India.
5
evasion, these resources are lost and thus unavailable to productive economic
activities.
A key argument considered in this study is that reducing FFS and using revenues
to cut distortionary labour taxes can be welfare-enhancing, since welfare losses
associated with smuggling and tax evasion are also reduced. In line with Parry
and Williams (2010), this study contrasts such labour tax cuts with other ways
of recycling reform revenues: increasing public expenditure, or the provision of
uniform lump-sum transfers to citizens.
4. Energy subsidies in Nigeria
As a developing country with substantial fossil resource wealth and a mixed
track record of fiscal prudence and transparency, Nigeria is a frequently cited
case for studying FFS and natural resource management (Rentschler, 2016).
Through the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency, Nigeria main-
tains artificially low energy prices – most notably for kerosene and petrol. The
gap between fuel import costs and regulated prices are financed through the
Petroleum Support Fund, which administers fuel subsidies.3
At nearly 5% of GDP in 2011 subsidies are a significant expense for the govern-
ment, and fail to reach Nigerians in more than one sense (IMF, 2013; Soile and
Mu, 2015): As with all FFS schemes, the direct financial benefits to households
are concentrated on the rich, thus failing to benefit the absolute poor (who con-
stitute 61% of the population4). In addition, a complex and opaque system of
intermediary dealers and political influence means that, instead of lowering the
market price, subsidies are often privately appropriated before the fuel reaches
the market. Finally, rampant fuel smuggling means subsidy benefits are leaking
out of the country.
Facing mounting fiscal pressures and recognising the inefficiencies of its subsidy
scheme, Nigeria attempted a radical subsidy reform in 2012. While the need for
such reform was pressing, the government failed to garner sufficient public sup-
port for its reform efforts. Public opposition to the reform had two key reason
in particular: (i) A lack of credibility and transparency with respect to the han-
dling of reform revenues, and (ii) inadequate plans for compensation and social
protection, resulting from a poor understanding of the needs and vulnerability
of affected energy consumers. Subsidy removal was met with extensive strikes
and violent public protests, and prompted the government to swiftly reintroduce
subsidies (Bazilian and Onyeji, 2012; Siddig et al., 2014).
3The Petroleum Support Fund is managed by the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory
Agency, and receives a set allocation in the federal budget. Contributions to the fund are
made by the federal, state, and local governments. Moreover, the fund is supplemented
by subsidy “surpluses”, which essentially occur when international market prices exceed the
government-set fuel price (GSI, 2012).
4This figure is based on the national absolute poverty definition, using an absolute poverty
line of N54,401 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010)
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5. Illicit dealings: A Computable General Equilibrium model
The basic structure of this model builds on Hosoe et al. (2010), who offer a small
open economy CGE model featuring a representative household, two sectors,
and a government. The model in this study distinguishes five income quintiles,
introduces fossil fuel subsidies, and adds several non-standard features: A small
group of households is modelled to engage in fuel smuggling activities. The
profits of smuggling depend on the price differential between the domestic and
international price of fuel, which is determined through the level of subsidies
paid. Moreover, the model allows for the evasion of production and factor
taxes. In order to represent different policy options for using reform revenues,
the model considers (1) government expenditure, (2) direct cash transfers, and
(3) reductions of pre-existing taxes.
5.1. Tax evasion: Representation in the model
In this model it is assumed that firms choose to evade taxes on different factors
and on production, while incurring a real cost of evasion. Formally, factor taxes
τfh,j on factor h and sector j are evaded at the rate e
f
h,j . Similarly, production
taxes τzj are evaded at the rate e
z
j .
In line with Liu (2013), tax evasion activities incur real costs F lossh,j and X
loss
j :
F lossh,j = c(e
f
h,j)Fh,j with c(e
f
h,j) =
Afh,j
Nfh,j + 1
(efh,j)
Nfh,j+1 (1)
X lossj = c(e
z
j )Zj with c(e
z
j ) =
Azj
Nzj + 1
(ezj )
Nzj +1 (2)
This setting implies that the cost of tax evasion is measured as a share c(e) of
either factor inputs Fh,j (in the case of factor tax evasion) or production Zj (for
production tax evasion). Parameters Afh,j , A
z
j , N
f
h,j , and N
z
j characterise the
cost function and are determined during calibration (section 6). The total net
benefit to firm j from evading factor taxes is
∑
h Fh,j(τ
f
h,je
f
h,jp
f
h − c(efh,j)).
Evasion losses reflect the extra (unproductive) “self-input” due to evasion ef-
forts. Specifically, if a firm engages in evasion activities, a share of its resources
will be directed towards this evasion activity rather than production (e.g. labour
hours). This unproductive evasion activity means that fewer resources are avail-
able for producing output, thus resulting in the output loss X lossj .
Moreover, the marginal costs of evading taxes can be expressed as
∂c(efh,j)
∂efh,j
= Afh,j(e
f
h,j)
Nfh,j and
∂c(ezj )
∂ezj
= Azj (e
z
j )
Nzj . (3)
Since these marginal costs are increasing in efh,j or e
z
j , firms choose evasion rates
and factor input quantities as to maximise profits (Section 5.3).
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5.2. Smuggling: Representation in the model
In practice, fuel subsidies often incentivise smuggling, as subsidised domestic
energy prices are significantly lower than in neighbouring countries, where fuel
prices are unregulated. This price gap presents a lucrative opportunity for
smugglers, who buy energy at the subsidised domestic price and sell it abroad
at the unregulated market price. However, in doing so smugglers are likely to
incur real costs, e.g. in the form of bribes or transport costs (Mlachila et al.,
2016).
For the sake of consistency, this model not only allows such outbound smuggling
(smuggling “exports”); it also considers the possibility of inbound smuggling
(“imports”), which may occur by the same logic when domestic fuel subsidies
are removed and fuel taxes imposed.
In this model, smugglers are assumed to choose the smuggling quantity ESMj
(“exports”, i.e. outbound smuggling) as to maximise their profit. They purchase
fuel for smuggling in the domestic market at the subsidised price (1 − sej)pqj
(where sej is the subsidisation rate), and sell it abroad at the export price p
e
j .
In addition, smugglers incur smuggling costs Elossj , e.g. transportation costs.
Analogously, they may also choose to conduct inbound smuggling MSMj (“im-
ports”). In this case they will purchase fuel abroad at the import price pmj ,
and sell it domestically at the subsidised (or taxed) price (1− sej)pqj . Thus, the
smugglers optimisation problem is given by
ESM,MSM
max piSM =
(
pej − (1− sej)pqj
)
ESMj − (1− sej)pqjElossj
+
(
(1− sej)pqj − pmj
)
MSMj − pmj M lossj (4)
subject to Elossj =
ASMj
r
[
ESMj
]r
(5)
M lossj =
ASMj
r
[
MSMj
]r
(6)
ESMj (or M
SM
j ) denotes the smuggled quantity from sector j, while the total
cost of smuggling is denoted by Elossj (or M
loss
j ) expressed as a share of the
total smuggled quantity. The shape of the cost function is characterised by
parameters ASMj and r, both of which are determined during calibration (section
6).5
The smuggler’s profit is maximised under following first order conditions:
∂piSMj
∂ESMj
= pej − (1− sej)pqj = (1− sej)pqjASMj
(
ESMj
)r−1
(FOC 1.1)
∂piSMj
∂MSMj
= (1− sej)pqj − pmj = pmj ASMj
(
MSMj
)r−1
(FOC 1.2)
5A sensitivity analysis for these parameters is provided in section 10.
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For both FOC 1.1 and FOC 1.2, piSMj is maximised when the marginal benefit
of smuggling (LHS) is equal to its marginal cost (RHS). Note that the sign of
the subsidisation rate sej plays a key role in determining whether the smuggler
chooses inbound or outbound smuggling. Solving the first order conditions yields
the profit maximising smuggling quantities ESMj and M
SM
j .
ESMj =
[
pej − (1− sej)pqj
(1− sej)pqjASMj
] 1
r−1
(7)
MSMj =
[
(1− sej)pqj − pmj
pmj A
SM
j
] 1
r−1
(8)
5.3. Domestic production
The comparably simplistic model by Liu (2013) is extended to include interme-
diate inputs. A neat way of modelling intermediate inputs is by distinguishing
two stages of the production process. In the first stage, the firm uses primary
factors (i.e. labour, capital) to produce a composite factor. In the second stage,
the firm combines the composite factor with intermediate inputs to produce its
output. This section formally describes the firm’s profit maximisation problem.
First stage:
The firm’s first production stage is described by a Cobb-Douglas production
function, which is homogeneous of degree one and exhibits constant returns
to scale. It maximises profits by choosing the quantity of its output (i.e. the
composite factor Yj), of its inputs (i.e. production factors Fh,j), and the factor
tax evasion rate efh,j .
Y,F,ef
max piyj =
{
pyjYj −
∑
h
(
1 + τfh,j
(
1− efh,j
))
pfhFh,j − pfhF lossh,j
}
(9)
s.t. Yj = bj
∏
h
F
βh,j
h,j (10)
The first term of the profit function reflects revenues from the sale of the com-
posite factor Yj at the price p
y
j . The second term is the sum of the post-tax
costs of factor inputs (net of tax evasion), with τfh,j representing factor taxes
and efh,j the tax-specific evasion rate for factor h and sector j. Note that Fh,j
denotes total factor inputs, out of which the amount F lossh,j (the third term) is
lost due to evasion activities.
Standard Lagrangian optimisation yields the following first order conditions:
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∂piyj
∂efh,j
= Afh,j(e
f
h,j)
Nfh,j = τfh,j (FOC 2.1)
∂piyj
∂Fh,j
= pfh
(
1 + τfh,j(1− efh,j) + c(efh,j)
)
= pyjβh,j
Yj
Fh,j
(FOC 2.2)
Note that FOC 2.1 states that at optimum the firm’s marginal cost of evasion
(LHS) is equal to the marginal benefit of evading tax (RHS). Similarly, FOC
2.2 states that the marginal cost of an additional unit of input (LHS) equals the
its marginal cost (RHS).
Moreover, using FOC 2.1 the optimal evasion rate efh,j can be derived:
efh,j =
(
τfh,j
Afh,j
) 1
N
f
h,j
(11)
Equation 11 shows that the optimal evasion rate is increasing in the factor tax
rate (τfh,j).
By plugging efh,j into the original cost equation (1), the cost of evasion at opti-
mum can be determined. This also allows solving for and calibrating parameter
Afh,j , as all other parameters are known (section 6.2). FOC 2.2 allows solving
for the optimal factor demand Fh,j :
Fh,j = βh,j
pyj
pfh(1 + τ
f
h,j(1− efh,j) + c(efh,j))
Yj ∀h, j (12)
Second stage:
The firm’s second production stage is described by a Leontief production func-
tion, which is homogeneous of degree one and exhibits constant returns to scale.
Note that the Cobb-Douglas production function in the first stage can describe
substitution between factors, while a Leontief function cannot. However, by
applying a Leontief production function in the second stage the computational
complexity of the model can be reduced considerably (Hosoe et al., 2010).
The firm maximises profits by choosing the quantity of output (Zj), of interme-
diate inputs (Xi,j), of the composite factor (Yj), and the production tax evasion
rate ezj .
Z,Y,X,ez
max pizj =
{
pzjZj + τ
z
j e
z
jp
z
jZj
− pyjYj −
∑
i
pqi (1− sei )Xi,j − pqj(1− sei )X lossj
} (13)
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s.t. Zj = min
[
Xi,j
axi,j
,
Yj
ayj
]
(14)
The first term of the profit function denotes revenues from the sale of outputs,
the second term denotes the benefit from tax evasion, the third and fourth terms
denote the cost of composite and intermediate inputs, while the last term is the
cost of evasion. Moreover, axi,j (or ayj) is the input requirement coefficient of
the i-th intermediate input (or j-th composite factor) for one unit of the output
j.
The production function (equation 14) can be used to replace Xi,j and Yj , and
thus derive an unconstrained maximisation problem:
Z,ez
max pizj =
{
pzjZj + τ
z
j e
z
jp
z
jZj − pyjayiZj
−
∑
i
(
1− sei
)
pqi axi,jZj −
(
1− sej
)
pqjc(e
z
j )Zj
)} (15)
This yields the following first order conditions:
∂pizj
∂ezj
= pzjτ
z
j =
(
1− sej
)
pqjA
z
j (e
z
j )
Nzj (FOC 3.1)
∂pizj
∂Zh,j
= (1 + τzj e
z
j − c(ezj ))pzj = pyjayj +
∑
i
(1− sei )pqi axi,j (FOC 3.2)
As in the case with factor tax evasion, the firm chooses production tax evasion
such that the marginal benefit of tax evasion (LHS of FOC 3.1) is equal to the
marginal cost (RHS of FOC 3.1). This means that the firm’s optimal level of
production tax evasion ezj can be expressed as
ezj =
(
pzj(
1− sej
)
pqj
τzj
Azj
) 1
Nz
j
. (16)
Note that the optimal evasion rate is increasing in the production tax rate (τzj ).
To summarise, the following set of equations describes the firms’ behaviour for
optimising its two stage production process:
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Fh,j = βh,j
pyj
pfh(1 + τ
f
h,j(1− efh,j) + c(efj ))
Yj ∀h, j (17)
Xi,j = axi,jZj (18)
Yj = ayjZj (19)
Yj = bj
∏
h
F
βh,j
h,j (20)
Zj = min
[
Xi,j
axi,j
,
Yj
ayj
]
(21)
efh,j =
(
τfh,j
Afh,j
) 1
N
f
h,j
and ezj =
(
pzj(
1− sej
)
pqj
τzj
Azj
) 1
Nz
j
(22)
Lastly, note that the Leontief production function implies rectangular isoquants,
which are prone to computational problems due to their kinks. Thus, as sug-
gested by Hosoe et al. (2010), equation 21 is replaced with a unit cost function
for computational purposes. This unit cost function can be obtained by trans-
forming the zero profit condition pizj = 0 using functions 18 and 19:
pzj = ayjp
y
j +
∑
i
pqi (1− sei )axi,j + pqj(1− sej)c(ezj ) (23)
5.4. Government
The government in this model takes the role of levying taxes, consuming goods,
and providing subsidies and direct cash transfers. Formally, government con-
sumption Xgi is a sum of its revenues from different tax sources, net of subsidy
payments (Sef ) and cash transfers (Ct
tax
l ):
Xgi =
µi
pqi
(∑
l
T dl +
∑
h
∑
j
T fh,j +
∑
j
T zj +
∑
j
Tmj −
∑
j
Sej −
∑
l
Cttaxl
)
(24)
The share of the i-th good in government expenditure is denoted µi. Prices are
denoted pqi for the i-th composite good, p
f
h for production factors, p
z
j for output,
and pmj for imports. Direct taxes T
d
l are levied on the factor endowment FFh,l
of household l at the rate τdl .
T dl = τ
d
l
(∑
h
pfhFFh,l
)
(25)
Factor taxes T fh,j are levied on firms’ factor inputs at the rate τ
f
h,j and are
subject to evasion.
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T fh,j = (1− efh,j)τfh,jpfhFh,j (26)
Production taxes T zj are levied on output Zj by firm j at the effective tax rate
(1− ezj )τzj after evasion.
T zj = (1− ezj )τzj pzjZj (27)
Import taxes are levied on imports Mj at the rate τ
m
j .
Tmj = τ
m
j p
m
j Mj (28)
Besides public expenditure on goods (Xgi ), the government also provides energy
subsidies Sej at the rate s
e
j .
Sej = s
e
jp
q
j
(∑
l
Xpj,l +
∑
i
Xj,i +X
loss
j
)
(29)
Note that the subsidy sej is provided for household consumption (X
p
j,l) and for
energy as an intermediate input (Xj,i). Government and investment demand
(Xgi and X
v
i ) are not subsidised. Cash transfers Ct
tax
l are defined in section 5.6.
5.5. Investments and savings
Given the static setting of the model, dynamic aspects such as investment and
savings cannot be reflected in their strict sense. However, recognising that these
activities can constitute significant shares of final demand, a virtual investment
account is incorporated (Hosoe et al., 2010). This account is modelled to use
savings from households and abroad to invest these in investment goods. For-
mally, investment demand Xvi is given by
Xvi =
λi
pqi
(∑
l
Sspl + εSs
f
)
(30)
Sspl = ss
p
l
(∑
h
pfhFFh,l + Ct
tax
l + Ct
z
l +
∑
h
Ctfl,h
)
(31)
To avoid confusion with subsidies (Se), savings are denoted Ssf for the foreign
sector (at exchange rate ε), and Ssp for households. Moreover, the parameter
λi denotes the expenditure share of the i-th good in overall investment; the
average propensity to save is denoted ssg for the government and sspl for house-
holds. Household income from cash transfers (Ctl) are detailed in the following
subsection.
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5.6. Households
This study distinguishes five households, each representing an income quintile,
as well as an additional smuggler, representing a relatively small number of
households engaged in fuel smuggling activities. Households are modelled to
maximise their utility subject to a standard budget constraint. The optimised
consumption choice Xpi,l can be expressed as
Xpi,l =
αi,l
pqi (1− sei )
(∑
h
pfhFFh,l + Ct
tax
l + Ct
z
l +
∑
h
Ctfl,h − Sspl − T dl
)
.
(32)
The first term in the round parentheses reflects income from factor income (e.g.
wages); the second term reflects direct government transfers for redistributing
tax revenues; and the third and fourth terms reflect the benefits of produc-
tion (Ctzl ) and factor (Ct
f
l,h) tax evasion which ultimately accrue to households.
These income sources are balanced by savings (Sspl ), direct tax payments (T
d
l ),
and consumption (Xpi,l) of good i which is determined by αi,l, the share param-
eter in the utility function.
Government cash transfers for redistributing tax revenues are implied by equa-
tion 24 and can be expressed as:
Cttaxl = R
tax
l
(∑
l
T dl +
∑
h
∑
j
T fh,j +
∑
j
T zj +
∑
j
Tmj
−
∑
j
Sej −
∑
i
pqiX
g
i
) (33)
The overall budget for these redistribution transfers is given by tax revenues
from four different tax types, from which subsidy payments and government
consumption must be subtracted. The redistribution rule Rtaxl determines the
share of the overall redistribution budget obtained by each household. Cash
transfers Cttaxl will play a key role as a means for redistributing subsidy reforms
revenues in the policy simulations of this study.
Moreover, household income from tax evasion activities are defined as
Ctzl = R
z
l
∑
j
τzj e
z
jp
z
jZj (34)
for the evasion of production taxes, and
Ctfl,h = R
f
l,h
∑
j
τfh,je
f
h,jp
f
hFh,j (35)
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for factor tax evasion. The benefits of tax evasion are distributed across house-
holds according to redistribution rules Rzl and R
f
l . The numerical values of
these parameters are chosen to reflect the distribution of consumption and fac-
tor endowments.
In addition to the five households, this model considers a smuggler who consumes
the same goods as all other households, but earns income from fuel smuggling
activities. Thus, the smuggler’s budget constraint prescribes that his consump-
tion expenditure equals smuggling profits:
XSMj =
αj
pqj(1− sej)
∑
j
piSMj (36)
Based on anecdotal evidence that fuel smuggling is typically done by low in-
come households, the smuggler’s share parameter αj is calibrated according to
the share paramenter of the 2nd income quintile household. Note that for con-
sistency, the above notation allows smuggling in all sectors j, yet the empirical
evidence suggests that it is a relevant consideration only in the petrol sector.
5.7. Exports, imports, and the balance of payments
For considering the implications of cross-border smuggling, the use of an open
economy model is necessary. This section briefly sets out the interaction between
the model economy and the rest of the world. For this purpose a small open
economy set-up is used, which implies that import and export prices (denom-
inated in foreign currency terms) are exogenously given. Formally, domestic
import (pmi ) and export prices (p
e
i ), are linked to their corresponding world
prices (pWmi and p
We
i ) through the exchange rate ε.
pei = εp
We
i (37)
pmi = εp
Wm
i (38)
The balance of payments condition requires that monetary outflows (i.e. due to
imports Mi, and inbound smuggling M
SM
i and M
loss
i ) equal inflows.
∑
i
pWmi
(
Mi +M
SM
i +M
loss
i
)
=
∑
i
pWei Ei + Ss
f +
∑
i
pWei E
SM
i (39)
Monetary inflows comprise exports (Ei), “foreign savings” or the current ac-
count deficit (Ssf ), and gross earnings from the foreign sale of smuggled fuel
(ESMi ).
Substitution between imports and domestic goods
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Moreover, an “Armington composite good” is introduced to reflect the widely ac-
cepted notion that imports and domestic goods are imperfect substitutes (Arm-
ington, 1969). Thus, this reflects a modelling approach which allows endogenous
market shares for imported goods, as opposed to a “cheapest takes all” setting.
In its essence, this approach introduces profit maximising firms which choose a
combination of imported and domestic goods to produce the Armington com-
posite – which is then consumed by households, firms, and the government.
Thus, the solution of their profit maximisation determines the demand for im-
ports and domestic goods (and is thus also directly influenced by the respective
prices).
Using the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function
Qi = γi (δmiM
ηi
i + δdiD
ηi
i )
1
ηi (40)
a standard profit maximisation procedure yields demand functions for imports
and the domestic good:
Mi =
(
γηii δmip
q
i
(1 + τmi )p
m
i
) 1
1−ηi
Qi (41)
Di =
(
γηii δdip
q
i
pdi
) 1
1−ηi
Qi (42)
In terms of notation, Qi denotes the i-th Armington composite good, which
is composed of imports (Mi) and domestic goods (Di). The coefficients δmi
and δdi denote the respective input shares of the composite good (fulfilling
0 ≤ δmi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δdi ≤ 1, and δmi + δdi = 1); while γi is the scaling coefficient
in the composite production function. Prices are defined for the Armington
composite good (pqi ), imports (p
m
i ), and domestic goods (p
d
i ). Lastly, ηi is a
parameter defined by the elasticity of substitution σi (ηi = (σi − 1)/σi, with
ηi ≤ 1).
Transformation between exports and domestic goods
In direct analogy to the demand side, imperfect transformation on the supply
side (i.e. between exports and domestic goods) is reflected using a constant
elasticity of transformation (CET) production function. Similar to the CES
function, this setting allows that the gross domestic output of a good comprises
both exports and domestic supply, the ratio of which is determined by their
relative prices.
Formally, this is modelled by introducing a “virtual” profit maximising firm,
which transforms the gross domestic output (Zi) into exports (Ei) and domes-
tically supplied goods (Di) according to following CET production function:
Zi = θi
(
ξeiE
φi
i + ξdiD
φi
i
) 1
φi
(43)
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By solving a standard profit maximisation problem following supply rules for
exports and domestic goods are obtained:
Ei =
(
θφii ξei(1 + τ
z
i (1− ezj ))pzi
pei
) 1
1−φi
Zi (44)
Di =
(
θφii ξdi(1 + τ
z
i (1− ezj ))pzi
pdi
) 1
1−φi
Zi (45)
In terms of notation, Zi denotes the gross domestic output of the i-th good,
which can either be exported (Ei) or supplied domestically (Di). The coeffi-
cients ξei and ξdi are the share coefficient of the transformation process (fulfill-
ing 0 ≤ ξei ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ξdi ≤ 1, and ξei + ξdi = 1). Moreover, θi is the scaling
coefficient characterising the transformation. Prices are defined for gross domes-
tic output (pzi ), exports (p
e
i ), and domestic goods (p
d
i ). Lastly, φi is a parameter
defined by the elasticity of transformation ψi (φi = (ψi + 1)/ψi, with φi ≤ 1).
5.8. Market clearing
To reach an equilibrium, conditions need to be formulated that ensure the equiv-
alence of demand and supply in goods and factor markets. The goods market
equilibrium is achieved when following condition is met:
Qi =
∑
l
Xpi,l +X
g
i +X
v
i +
∑
j
Xi,j +X
SM
i +X
loss
i + E
loss
i (46)
This condition implies that the supply of the i-th Armington composite good
must equal its aggregate demand. Demand is composed of demand by house-
holds (Xpi,l), the government (X
g
i ), investment (X
v
i ), firms (Xi,j), and the smug-
gler (XSMi ); in addition some of the goods are lost as inputs to tax evasion
(X lossi ) and smuggling (E
loss
i ) activities.
The second market clearing condition ensures an equilibrium in the factor mar-
ket:
∑
l
FFh,l =
∑
j
(
Fh,j + F
loss
h,j
)
(47)
This implies that the sum of endowments of the h-th factor (FFh,l) must equal
the aggregate factor demand. Note that firms’ total factor demand is the sum of
standard factor demands for production (Fh,j) and factors used for the purpose
of tax evasion activities (e.g. labour), denoted F lossh,j .
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6. Calibration and data
Section 6.1 describes data sources used for this study. Sections 6.2 and 6.3
provide detailed derivations for the calibration of latent parameters.
6.1. Data
6.1.1. Economic variables
The baseline values for macro-economic parameters have been obtained from
the GTAP 9 database – in particular, Nigeria’s social accounting matrix (SAM)
for the 2011 reference year. These macro-economic parameters are the size of
economic sectors (i.e. output), intermediate inputs, capital and labour inputs,
taxes, government expenditure, household consumption, imports, exports, and
the current account balance. Four sectors are distinguished: (i) the (subsidised)
petrol sector, (ii) the (unsubsidised) energy sector, which excludes petrol, (iii)
the formal (non-energy) sector, and (iv) the informal (non-energy) sector. The
parameters and coefficients αi,l, βh,j , bi, γi, µi, λi, θi, axi,j , ayj , δmi, δdi, ξei,
ξdi, sspl, and ssg have been calibrated on the basis of the 2011 baseline data,
and the model equations set out in Section 5.
Since the GTAP 9 SAM does not provide information on the distribution of in-
come and consumption, overall household consumption figures have been split
into income quintiles according to expenditure shares contained in the Har-
monised Nigeria Living Standards Survey 2010. Across income quintiles, this
household expenditure survey provides details on the level of spending on petrol,
other energy, and non-energy consumption goods. It is thus essential for the
distributional aspects considered in this study.
Data on FFS in Nigeria have been obtained from the International Energy
Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2015 Fossil Fuel Subsidies database (IEA,
2015). Based on the price gap definition, the IEA provides an estimate of
$7.1 bn of fossil fuel consumption subsidies in 2011, of which over $6.5 bn are
paid to subsidise oil (primarily petrol). This figure, in combination with the
estimated size of the petrol sector, translates to a baseline subsidisation rate
of 17.8%.6 Finally, population data has been obtained from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators database.
6.1.2. Tax evasion
For the purpose of comparing sectors with high and low tax evasion, Liu (2013)
uses the self-employment rate of an economy to approximate the size of the
high-evasion sector. This approach works particularly well in developed and
emerging economies, for which reasonably reliable estimates of self-employment
are available from sources such as the International Labour Organization (ILO).
However, the ILO’s Labour Statistics database offers no estimate of the self-
employment rate in Nigeria.
6 For clarity, the baseline subsidisation rate is indicated in the results (rounded to 18%).
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Instead of relying on uncertain alternative estimates for self-employment, this
study uses the size of the informal sector as a proxy for the high-evasion sector.
The advantage of this approach is that estimates of informal economic sectors
exist for a wide range of countries – including developing countries – and are
based on a consistent estimation procedure. Specifically, the formal economy
estimates from the GTAP 9 database are supplemented by including an infor-
mal sector, which in 2011 measured 50% of GDP in Nigeria according to the
comprehensive analysis by Hassan and Schneider (2016).
This study uses a very conservative estimate of 2% for the tax evasion rate
in the formal economy. For comparison, Liu (2013) uses a 5% evasion rate
in a selection of 27 developed and emerging economies, based on estimates
by Slemrod (2007). The Swedish National Tax Agency (2008) reports a 4.8%
evasion rate for income taxes in its jurisdiction. In line with the notion of
informality, this study assumes that the informal sector does not pay any taxes.
Moreover, this study uses the conservative assumption by Liu (2013), that 10%
of evaded taxes are spent on non-productive evasion activities (see Section 3).
The net benefits of tax evasion are assumed to ultimately accrue to households;
in line with the distribution shares of regular income, the top income quintile is
assumed to benefit disproportionately more than lower quintiles.
Based on these numbers, the evasion parameters Afh,j , N
f
h,j , A
z
j , and N
z
j can be
calibrated to characterise the evasion cost functions (Eq. 1 and 2). Section 6.2
provides detailed derivations associated with the calibration of these parameters.
6.1.3. Smuggling
This section outlines the steps taken to estimate the baseline magnitude of fuel
smuggling out of Nigeria.
The first step is to focus on smuggling activity from Nigeria to Benin (and
from there to Togo), as detailed estimates are available from the IMF (Mlachila
et al., 2016). While Togo does not share a border with Nigeria, its distance
to the Nigerian border is under 120 km, and thus extensive smuggling occurs
via Benin (Figure 1). The IEA (2016) reports total gasoline consumption for
Benin (616 k tonnes) and Togo (175 k tonnes) in 2011. The IMF outlines that
in both Benin and Togo respectively, gasoline is sold on two separate markets
(Mlachila et al., 2016): an official market for the sale of legal and regulated
gasoline, as well as an informal market for the sale of gasoline smuggled from
Nigeria. Mlachila et al. (2016) estimate that the informal market constituted
about 85% of total gasoline consumption in Benin in 2011, and 70.7% in Togo.
This allows the computation of the absolute size of the informal markets (in
physical units), which reflects the quantity of smuggled fuel.
The revenues earned by smugglers are then estimated by multiplying the to-
tal smuggled quantity of gasoline with the respective price differential between
Nigeria’s official subsidised market price and Benin’s (or Togo’s) informal mar-
ket price. These informal market prices are also reported by Mlachila et al.
(2016).
The second step is to extrapolate the smuggling estimates for Benin (and Togo)
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to Nigeria’s remaining neighbouring countries Niger and Cameroon.7 Using
the border length between Benin and Nigeria (773 km), and by assuming that
the smuggled quantity is proportional to the length of the external border, a
rough estimate of total smuggling can be obtained. In other words, the longer
the border between Nigeria and a neighbouring country, the more smuggling
activity takes place towards this country. For instance, Nigeria shares a 773 km
border with Benin and 1,497 km with Niger, thus the quantity of fuel smuggled
to Niger should be roughly twice as large.
Nigeria Benin Togo Niger Cameroon Chad
Border with Nigeria (km) – 773 – 1,497 1,690 89
Gasoline price (N/litre) 97.4 162.8 182.9 167.4 186.8 204.6
Pop. in bordering – 27.9 – 23.6 16.5 6.1
Nigerian states (m)
Av. fuel consumption – 286 – 100 175 insig.
in bordering Nigerian
states (N/month)
Table 1: Parameters used for refining extrapolated smuggling estimates
The third step is to refine this extrapolation by making two further adjustments:
• Population: Since the states bordering Benin are particularly populous
(and states in Northern Nigeria are sparsely populated), the smuggling
estimate is further adjusted proportional to the population size in Nige-
rian border states. This reflects the presumption that a larger population
means that more smugglers are present and that more smuggling takes
place. Moreover, this accounts for the fact that population densities on
two sides of a border tend to be correlated; thus taking into account the
number of foreign consumers demanding smuggled fuel.
• Availability of energy: Furthermore, the availability of gasoline varies sig-
nificantly across Nigeria, and directly affects the quantity of gasoline avail-
able for smuggling: The states bordering Benin are more developed and
urbanised, and offer better access to energy goods. This is not least due
to proximity to harbours, where imported gasoline is landed, and better
distribution infrastructure. In more remote states gasoline tends to be less
widely available and more expensive (reflecting domestic transport costs),
thus reducing smugglers’ profit margins. To reflect these factors, smug-
gling estimates are further adjusted in line with the average per capita
expenditure on gasoline in each of the relevant bordering states (Figure
1).
7Chad shares a 89 km border with Nigeria. This implies that smuggling quantities to Chad
are negligible for the purpose of this study.
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To summarise the three estimation steps outlined above, the total quantity of
smuggled fuel is estimated as
ESMPetrol =
∑
c
SQc
=
∑
c
[
BLc
BLBenin
AFCc
AFCBenin
Popc
PopBenin
SQBenin
]
(48)
where:
• SQBenin = Petrol quantity smuggled to Benin (and from there also to
Togo)
• SQc = Estimated petrol quantity smuggled to neighbouring country c
• BLc = Length of external border shared by Nigerian states and country c
• AFCc = Average petrol consumption per capita in Nigerian states sharing
a border with country c
• Popc = Population in Nigerian states sharing a border with country c.
Based on this method a total petrol smuggling estimate of $ 641 m is obtained,
about 43% of which is smuggled to Benin and Togo, 33% to Cameroon, 24% to
Niger, and less than 1% to Chad.
Mlachila et al. (2016) report that petrol smuggled from Nigeria is sold in Benin
with an average mark-up ranging between approximately 20% and 40%. They
note that informal prices in Benin are lower (i.e. the mark-up smaller) closer
to the Nigerian border. This mark-up contains the cost of smuggling (including
transport costs), but also profits by smugglers and middlemen. This study
makes the assumption that the cost of smuggling corresponds to 10% of the
smuggling value.8
8The overall results of this study are not found to be influenced significantly by increasing
the cost of smuggling to 20% or 30%.
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Figure 1: Monthly per capita petrol expenditure in Nigerian border states (in Naira).
6.2. Calibration of evasion parameters Afh,j, N
f
h,j, A
z
j , and N
z
j
Following parameter calibrations are based on the SAM, constructed for the
purpose of this CGE model using the data described above. The benefit of
factor tax evasion is recorded in the SAM as the entry SAMEV h,j , which is
equivalent to τfh,je
f0
h,jp
f0
h,jF
0
h,j in the model’s notation. Superscripts 0 denote
baseline (i.e. observed) values. By replacing ef0h,j with equation 11, A
f
h,j can be
expressed and calibrated as
Afh,j =
(
τfh,j
)Nfh,j+1 (
F 0h,j
)Nfh,j
SAM
Nfh,j
EV h,j
. (49)
The cost of factor tax evasion is recorded in the SAM as SAMEC h,j = p
f0
h c(e
f0
h,j)F
0
h,j .
This can be re-written as
SAMEC h,j = p
f0
h
Afh,j
Nfh,j + 1
(
ef0h,j
)Nfh,j+1
F 0h,j .
By replacing ef0h,j this can be written as
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SAMEC h,j = p
f0
h
Afh,j
Nfh,j + 1
(
τfh,j
Afh,j
)Nfh,j+1
N
f
h,j
F 0h,j .
Since at the baseline equilibrium pf0h = 1, the expression can be re-written
further:
SAMEC h,j =
(
τfh,j
)Nfh,j+1
N
f
h,j F 0h,j(
Afh,j
) 1
N
f
h,j (Nfh,j + 1)
Furthermore, by using equation 49 the term
(
Afh,j
) 1
N
f
h,j can be replaced:
SAMEC h,j =
SAMEV h,j(
τfh,j
)Nfh,j+1
N
f
h,j F 0h,j
(
τfh,j
)Nfh,j+1
N
f
h,j F 0h,j
Nfh,j + 1
.
Thus, Nfh,j can be expressed and calibrated as:
Nfh,j =
SAMEV h,j
SAMEC h,j
− 1 (50)
Analogously, the same procedure is used to calibrate parameters Azj and N
z
j
associated with the production tax evasion function:
Azj =
(
τzj
)Nzj +1 (Z0j )Nzj
SAM
Nzj
EV ENE,j
(51)
Nzj =
SAMEV ENE,j
SAMEC ENE,j
− 1 (52)
6.3. Calibration of smuggling parameters ASMj
The smuggling parameter ASMj can be calibrated based on the smuggler’s profit
maximisation expression in section 5.2 (in particular FOC 1.1):
ASMj =
pej − (1− sej)pqj
(1− sej)pqj(E0SMj )r−1
(53)
E0SMj is recorded in the SAM as the baseline value of smuggled goods.
23
7. Simulation scenarios
Scenario 1: Baseline
This scenario reproduces the baseline economy observed in the data. It serves as
a reference point for evaluating the results in the subsequent simulation scenar-
ios. It also enables a baseline evaluation of the regressivity of fossil fuel subsidies.
Scenario 2: Uncompensated subsidy reform
This scenario simulates an uncompensated petrol subsidy reduction and petrol
tax increase (from sePetrol = 0.22 to s
e
Petrol = −0.22).9 The government uses
reform revenues to increase government spending. Households receive no com-
pensation.
Scenario 3: Subsidy reform with cash transfers
This scenario simulates a petrol subsidy reduction and petrol tax increase, in
which reform revenues are redistributed to households uniformly in the form of
direct cash transfers. Each household – no matter the income level – receives
the same amount.
Scenario 4: Subsidy reform with labour tax reduction
This scenario simulates a petrol subsidy reduction and petrol tax increase, in
which reform revenues are used to reduce labour taxes (i.e. a double dividend
style fiscal reform). Labour taxes across all sectors are reduced.
Counter-factual scenario: Revenue neutral subsidy reform ignoring
tax evasion and smuggling
This scenario repeats the simulation of a double dividend style fiscal reform
(Scenario 4), but disregards tax evasion and smuggling activities. This enables
an assessment of the size of the evasion and smuggling effects on estimated
reform benefits.
8. Assessing welfare effects
8.1. Fiscal efficiency and social welfare
As Liu (2013) shows, a “double dividend” style tax reform – i.e. using envi-
ronmental tax revenue to reduce pre-existing taxes – can reduce, but not fully
9Note that, as mentioned previously, the baseline subsidisation rate observed in the data is
sePetrol = 0.18. This means that the simulation range mainly focusses on the FFS reduction
(0.18 to -0.22), but also provides estimates for the effects of an increase in FFS (from 0.18 to
0.22).
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eliminate, the social welfare cost of environmental taxes (Bovenberg and Goul-
der, 1996; Goulder, 1995b). The same welfare costs must be expected when FFS
reform revenue is used to reduce pre-existing taxes (simulation scenario 4).
To confirm this, this study estimates the social welfare cost of a double dividend
style FFS reform (i.e. scenario 4) by evaluating changes at the tax base.10
For this purpose, this study adopts the approach taken by Williams (2002),
Bento and Jacobsen (2007), and Liu (2013), who use the following expression
to measure the welfare effect of a change in the environmental tax rate – in this
case the subsidisation rate sej :
11
Welfare impact =
Tax base effects

∑
j
∑
h
τfh,j
(
1− efh,j
)
pfh
∂Fh,j
∂sej
+
∑
j
τzj (1− ezj )pzj
∂Zj
∂sej
−
∑
j
sejp
q
j
∂
(∑
lX
p
j,l +
∑
iXj,i +X
loss
j +X
SM
j
)
∂sej
Tax evasion effects

−
∑
j
∑
h
∂c(efh,j)
∂sej
pfhFh,j
−
∑
j
∂c(ezj )
∂sej
pzjZj
Smuggling effects

−
∑
j
pqj
∂Elossj
∂sej
−
∑
j
pmj
∂M lossj
∂sej
(54)
The first line represents the marginal change in factor tax revenues following a
change in the subsidisation rate. The second line represents the marginal change
in production tax revenues. The third line represents the marginal change in
subsidy payments (or petrol tax receipts, in the case of a negative subsidisation
rate). The fourth line represents the marginal change in real factor losses asso-
ciated with factor tax evasion. Similarly, the fifth line represents the marginal
change in real output losses due to production tax evasion. Lastly, lines six and
seven represent the marginal change in smuggling losses associated with out-
bound (Elossj ) and inbound smuggling (M
loss
j ). Note that Liu (2013) does not
consider subsidies, production tax evasion, and smuggling; likewise, this study
does not consider the environmental benefits due to emission reduction.
10Note that the term “welfare” here is used – in line with the literature – to refer to the fiscal
efficiency benefits of subsidy reform, and thus the associated increase in societal well-being.
It does not refer to household level consumption, which is covered by Section 8.2.
11See Liu (2013) for a full analytical derivation.
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8.2. Distribution and household welfare
In addition to the effects on fiscal efficiency and social welfare, this study con-
siders the reform’s effects on household welfare, i.e. utility. However, utility,
being an ordinal measure, is not a practical measure for the purpose of quan-
titative policy evaluation. This is especially the case when welfare effects on
heterogeneous households are to be quantified and compared.
Nevertheless, changes in utility levels can be monetised and thus consistently
evaluated and compared by computing Hicksian equivalent variations (Mas-
Colell et al., 1995; Hosoe et al., 2010; Durand-Lasserve et al., 2015). Equivalent
variation measures by how much households’ income would need to change (at
original price levels) to induce the same welfare change as caused by the pol-
icy reform. As the original price levels are used to monetise both baseline and
counter-factual utility, the equivalent variation measure allows consistent eval-
uation of fiscal reforms which directly affect prices.
The Hicksian equivalent variation for household l is obtained by minimising
expenditure for a given level of utility Ul:
X
p
i,l
min expl =
∑
i
pqiX
p
i,l (55)
subject to Ul =
∏
i
(Xpi )
αi (56)
Simple optimisation yields following expenditure function:
expl =
∏
i
(
Xpi,l
)αi∏
i α
αi
i
(57)
Note that at the baseline prices are normalised to unity. Hicksian equivalent
variation is defined as the difference between the baseline and counter-factual
expenditure:
HEVl = expl(p
q0
i , Ul)− expl(pq0i , U0l ) (58)
=
∏
i
(
Xpi,l
)αi∏
i α
αi
i
−
∏
i
(
Xp0i,l
)αi∏
i α
αi
i
(59)
9. Results
This section presents the key results from the simulations, while distinguishing
the different simulation scenarios wherever relevant or useful.
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9.1. Effect on the distribution of petrol consumption
In Nigeria FFS are predominantly provided for petrol consumption, thus this
section presents evidence on the inequality of petrol consumption across income
groups – and how this pattern changes as FFS are removed. The results show
that removing fuel subsidies (from a baseline subsidisation rate of 18%) will
cause a 21% reduction in national petrol consumption. Increasing a petrol tax
to 22% will cause an additional 36% reduction in consumption. Figure 2 shows
that – in absolute terms – the reduction in petrol consumption mainly occurs
in the top income quintile.
Figure 2: Annual per capita petrol expenditure by income quintiles (IQ) for different
subsidisation rates (in Naira)12.
9.2. Effect on subsidy (or tax) incidence
From a distributional perspective the key criticism of FFS is their highly regres-
sive nature (Arze del Granado et al., 2012). Figure 3 shows that in the baseline
scenario (sePetrol = 18%) most of the subsidy benefits are indeed received by the
top income quintile. Thus, in absolute terms, removing FFS and moving to fuel
taxation predominantly affects the top income quintile. Likewise in absolute
terms, imposing a fuel tax will also affect the top income quintile most heavily.
This illustrates why FFS reform is considered to be a progressive tax reform
– and why rich people and powerful political interest groups are often vocal
opponents to reform.
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Figure 3: Annual receipt (or payment) of fossil fuel subsidies (or taxes) in N per
capita for different income quintiles (IQ).
9.3. Effect on consumption
This section presents the estimated effects of subsidy reduction and energy tax
increase on the consumption expenditure of different income groups. For this
purpose distinguishing the different revenue redistribution mechanisms (i.e. sim-
ulation scenarios) is essential. All results in this section are presented as con-
sumption gains (or losses) relative to income, as this also enables an insight into
the vulnerability and exposure of different income groups.
Figure 4 presents relative consumption losses for an uncompensated subsidy
reform and tax increase (scenario 2). Reform revenues are used by the gov-
ernment to increase public spending. The estimates show that reform induced
consumption losses are relatively consistent at around 3-4% of income across
the whole income distribution. The reason for this is that in the case of Nige-
ria, energy shares in total consumption expenditure are relatively even across
income groups (ranging from about 4% to 7%; see Rentschler, 2016) – thus
uncompensated FFS removal affects different income quintile to similar extents
(relative to income).
Figure 5 presents relative consumption losses for a subsidy reform and tax in-
crease, with reform revenues redistributed uniformly to all households using
cash transfers (scenario 3). Note that this scenario does not simulate targeted
cash transfers (i.e. to specific income or population groups), but universal trans-
fers. While the highest income quintile (IQ 5) is estimated to incur consumption
losses despite the cash compensation, the first, second and third income quintiles
experience significant consumption increases. A full FFS removal (sePetrol = 0)
is estimated to increase consumption of the bottom income quintile by 3.4%,
while the introduction of a fuel tax (sePetrol = −0.22) increases this to 7%. The
reason for this progressive effect is that the highly regressive distribution of
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Figure 4: Scenario 2: Relative change in consumption for each income quintile.
benefits via FFS is replaced by a uniform distribution, such that post-reform
benefits received by low-income households significantly exceed their receipts
through FFS (vice versa for high-income households). Overall, this illustrates
that replacing (highly regressive) fuel subsidies with uniform cash compensa-
tion is a progressive fiscal reform. This observation applies analogously to the
imposition of petrol taxes, if the revenues are redistributed using uniform cash
transfers.
Figure 5: Scenario 3: Relative change in consumption for each income quintile.
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Figure 6 presents relative consumption losses for a subsidy reform, in which
reform revenues are used to reduce pre-existing labour taxes in all sectors (sce-
nario 4). Falling in a range between 0.7% (IQ1) and -0.5% (IQ5), the estimated
consumption changes are small compared to the other scenarios. The reason is
that no significant redistribution of resources takes place across income groups,
as in the case with cash transfers. Instead, households benefit from labour tax
rate reductions proportional to their pre-reform consumption spending. How-
ever, not visible in Figure 6, a significant shift takes place within households’
consumption bundles: As the tax base shifts, the aggregate consumption of
petrol falls by 35.5%, while consumption of formal sector goods increases by
1.3%. The net change resulting from shifting consumption bundles is depicted
in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Scenario 4: Relative change in consumption for each income quintile.
9.4. Effect on household welfare
This section presents the estimated welfare effects of subsidy removal and fuel
tax increases for each of the redistribution scenarios. As discussed in Section
8.2 welfare effects are measured as Hicksian equivalent variation.
Figure 7(a) shows that households across the entire income distribution incur
welfare losses as subsidies are reduced (and fuel taxes increased) without com-
pensation (scenario 2). A marginal welfare gain can be observed for all income
quintiles for a subsidisation rate of 22%, as it is higher than the baseline sub-
sidisation rate of 18%. Welfare losses are presented in absolute terms, and are
thus largest for the top income quintile. In addition, Figure 7(b) presents the
total welfare loss incurred by the whole population.
Figure 8 illustrated the redistribution of wealth associated with the uniform,
universal cash compensation scheme (scenario 3). Compared to the baseline
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(a) Equivalent variation by income quintiles (in N)
(b) Total equivalent variation (in mil. N) for different levels of subsidisation
Figure 7: Scenario 2: Change in welfare, measured by Hicksian equivalent variation.
(a) shows equivalent variation in per capita terms for each income quintile; (b) presents
national aggregate equivalent variation in mil. Naira.
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scenario, the bottom 60% (i.e. bottom three income quintiles) experience sig-
nificant welfare gains, at the expense of the richest 20%. The fourth income
quintile is barely affected in this scenario, as cash compensation offsets welfare
losses due to energy price increases.
(a) Equivalent variation by income quintiles (in N)
(b) Total equivalent variation (in mil. N) for different levels of subsidisation
Figure 8: Scenario 3: Change in welfare, measured by Hicksian equivalent variation.
(a) shows equivalent variation in per capita terms for each income quintile; (b) presents
national aggregate equivalent variation in mil. Naira.
Welfare effects in scenario 4 (presented in Figure 9) are less pronounced than
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in the first two scenarios, as previous results have also suggested (see Figure
6). The reason is that revenue redistribution using tax rate reductions benefits
households proportionally to their pre-reform consumption expenditure - thus
no significant redistribution across income groups takes place, and the reduction
of disposable income due to FFS removal is mostly offset.
(a) Equivalent variation by income quintiles (in N)
(b) Total equivalent variation (in mil. N) for different levels of subsidisation
Figure 9: Scenario 4: Change in welfare, measured by Hicksian equivalent variation.
(a) shows equivalent variation in per capita terms for each income quintile; (b) presents
national aggregate equivalent variation in mil. Naira.
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9.5. Effect on government expenditure
Figure 10 presents the estimated changes in government expenditure. The ob-
served effect depends crucially on the redistribution mechanism for reform rev-
enues. In scenario 2 the government uses revenues directly to increase public
spending. In scenarios 3 and 4 government spending remains mostly constant,
as reform revenues are used to finance either cash transfer schemes or tax re-
ductions.
Figure 10: Change in government expenditure, relative to baseline expenditure, for
different rates of subsidisation (baseline sePetrol = 0.18).
9.6. Effect on output
Figure 11(a) presents the estimated change in output for all sectors considered
in scenario 4. Full subsidy removal is estimated to result in a 10% reduction of
the petrol sector, while increasing petrol taxes to 22% would reduce this sector
even further to 20%. Estimated output changes are very similar in scenario 3,
thus not reported separately.
Figure 11(b) shows further that the largest absolute growth would occur in
the formal sector of the economy. This illustrates that FFS result in grave
misallocation of resources in favour of the petrol and energy sectors, crowding
out consumption from all other sectors.
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(a) Relative output change (%) for different subsidisation rates
(b) Absolute output change (mil. Naira) for different subsidisation rates
Figure 11: Scenario 4: Relative and absolute change in output in different sectors.
(a) presents the change relative to baseline output, while (b) presents absolute change
in mil. Naira.
35
9.7. Effect on labour tax evasion
This section presents the estimated changes in tax evasion activities for different
scenarios. As factor and production taxes remain unchanged in scenarios 2 and
3, tax evasion is not reduced significantly in most sectors (Figure 12). A notable
exception is the petrol sector. A significant reduction in the size (i.e. output) of
the petrol sector means that its tax burden decreases, and thus necessarily also
the amount of evaded taxes. As this observation is valid for scenarios 2 and 3,
only results for the latter are presented here (Figure 12). In scenario 4 reform
revenues are used exclusively to reduce labour taxes in all sectors. Accordingly,
Figure 12 shows a significant reduction in labour tax evasion throughout the
economy.
Figure 12: Scenario 3: Change in labour tax evasion for different subsidisation rates
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Figure 13: Scenario 4: Change in labour tax evasion for different subsidisation rates
9.8. Effect on fuel smuggling
This section presents the estimated changes in fuel smuggling as fuel subsidies
are decreased and taxes increased (Figure 14).
Figure 14: Percentage change in petrol smuggled out of (∆ESMPetrol) or into
(∆MSMPetrol) Nigeria in scenario 2.
Note that smuggling is positive for the baseline subsidisation rate, i.e. fuel is
being smuggled out of the country. As the subsidy is reduced, and eventu-
ally turned into an energy tax, the energy price differential between domestic
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and foreign fuel is reversed. Without measures to prevent smuggling, in-bound
smuggling takes place, thus undermining the energy tax. It should be noted
20that smuggling is not necessarily zero when the subsidisation (or tax) rate
sePetrol is zero; the smuggling quantity depends not only on s
e
Petrol, but also on
the ratio between prices pej and p
q
j (see equations 7 and 8).
Figure 15 presents the total value of fuel subsidy leakage (or fuel tax under-
mining) due to smuggling. Out-bound smuggling implies that fuel subsidies
provided by the home government are smuggled (i.e. leaked) out of the country.
In-bound smuggling implies that domestic energy taxes are being evaded, as
cheaper un-taxed fuel is smuggled in, thus reducing the government’s fuel tax
revenue.
Moreover, Figure 16 presents the losses associated with both outbound and
inbound smuggling activities (e.g. due to transport costs).
Figure 15: Total net subsidy value smuggled out (for sePetrol > 0), or fuel tax
undermined through inbound smuggling (for sePetrol < 0). In mil Naira.
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Figure 16: Total losses due to outbound (Eloss) and inbound smuggling (M loss).
9.9. Fiscal efficiency and social welfare: the role of tax evasion and smuggling
Figure 17 presents the social welfare cost of reform, which is used to evaluate
double dividend style reforms (see Section 8.1) – i.e. scenario 4. For reference
the figure presents welfare costs for a counter-factual simulation which omits
tax evasion and smuggling (line (a) in Figure 17), and the model which takes
these illicit activities into account (b).
The results show that taking into account illicit activities lowers the estimated
welfare costs of full FFS removal (i.e. sePetrol = 0) by 34% relative to the
counter-factual simulation (omitting tax evasion and smuggling). When fuel
taxes are further increased to 22% (i.e. sePetrol = −0.22), taking into account
illicit activities lowers the welfare cost by 36% relative to the counter-factual.
Figure 18 summarises these results: In the simulated range for the subsidisation
rate, the effect of tax evasion and smuggling reduces welfare costs by between
34% to 42%. The larger portion of this difference is due to the tax evasion effect
(accounting for 69% to 86% of the welfare cost reduction).
Overall, these results highlight that accounting for illicit activities, such as tax
evasion and fuel smuggling, can make a crucial difference when determining the
costs and benefits of FFS reform. Omitting these aspects may cause studies
to significantly under-estimate the benefits (or over-estimate the costs) of FFS
reform.
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Figure 17: Scenario 4: Welfare cost of FFS reform (a) without, (b) and with tax
evasion and smuggling taken into account (in mil N) for different subsidisation rates.
The reduction of welfare costs due to tax evasion effects (grey) is larger than the
reduction due to smuggling effects (blue).
Figure 18: Scenario 4: Percentage reduction of welfare cost of FFS reform when
illicit activities are taken into account (relative to counter-factual scenario). The tax
evasion effect (grey) accounts for a larger share of the reduction than the smuggling
effect (blue).
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10. Sensitivity and robustness
This section provides the results from sensitivity analyses around parameters
that may influence the key results: In particular it considers variations of + and
– 25% around the elasticities of substitution (σi) and transformation (ψi), the
parameter r in the smuggler’s loss function, and parameters Nfh,j and N
z
j in the
tax evasion loss functions.
10.1. The elasticities of substitution and transformation
To test the sensitivity of sectoral output estimates to variation in elasticity
values, low and high value cases for the elasticities of substitution and trans-
formation are considered. The elasticity of substitution in the CES production
function is given by σi (Equation 40, where ηi = (σi − 1)/σi, with ηi ≤ 1).
The elasticity of transformation in the CET production function is given by ψi
(Equation 43, where φi = (ψi+1)/ψi, with φi ≤ 1). The low case is defined as a
25% reduction of the elasticity value compared to the base run calibration (see
Section 6); the high case is defined as a 25% increase over the base run value.
σi; φi Base run Low case High case
sePetrol = 0.22 3,736,698 3,728,096 -0.23% 3,744,630 0.21%
Petrol sePetrol = 0 3,252,824 3,288,715 1.10% 3,217,423 -1.09%
sePetrol = −0.22 2,898,255 2,970,800 2.50% 2,827,282 -2.45%
sePetrol = 0.22 5,870,983 5,870,212 -0.01% 5,873,555 0.04%
Energy sePetrol = 0 5,720,992 5,735,723 0.26% 5,709,553 -0.20%
sePetrol = −0.22 5,607,641 5,635,414 0.50% 5,584,303 -0.42%
sePetrol = 0.22 142,209,300 142,341,800 0.09% 142,257,400 0.03%
Formal sePetrol = 0 143,031,500 143,116,800 0.06% 143,157,200 0.09%
sePetrol = −0.22 143,661,100 143,701,300 0.03% 143,849,000 0.13%
sePetrol = 0.22 114,992,600 115,065,200 0.06% 115,144,100 0.13%
Informal sePetrol = 0 114,866,800 114,996,800 0.11% 115,004,900 0.12%
sePetrol = −0.22 114,745,200 114,924,800 0.16% 114,868,500 0.11%
Table 2: Sensitivity of sectoral output to variation in the elasticities of substitution
(σi) and transformation (ψi). Absolute values represent the total value of output (in
mil Naira) for each sector in each case. Percentage values represent the deviation of
the low and high case estimates from the base run results.
Table 2 shows that the variation in elasticities has minimal impact on the esti-
mates. In addition, Figure 19 demonstrates that also the social welfare cost of
reform is robust to variation in the elasticities.
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Figure 19: Sensitivity to variation in σi and ψi: Percentage deviation of the social
welfare cost of reform from the base run estimation. Note that illicit activities are
taken into account in both cases.
10.2. Parameter r in the smuggling function
The smuggler is modelled to maximise their profits, by choosing the inbound and
outbound smuggling quantities (ESMj and M
SM
j ). His optimisation problem is
constrained by the cost of smuggling (e.g. transportation costs, bribes), which
primarily depends on the smuggled quantity, as well as parameters r and ASMj .
In the base run analysis the parameter value is set at r = 2, which assumes
linear smuggling behaviour.
This section demonstrates the sensitivity of smuggling estimates and the overall
results to a variation in parameter r. It presents model results for a low value
case of r (25% lower than the base run value), and a high value case (25%
higher). Note that the parameter ASMj is calibrated on the basis of r, thus
no separate sensitivity analysis is required (Section 6.3). Table 3 presents the
deviation of the estimated smuggling quantities for these low and high value
cases of r.
The percentage deviations in Table 3 appear large, in particular for subsidisation
rates close to zero. However, it should be noted that the absolute values are
small in all cases. This is illustrated by Figure 20, which demonstrates that the
variation in r mainly affects the curvature of the smuggling estimates. In both
the low and high cases of r the smuggling quantity can be below or above the
base run estimate, depending on the value of sePetrol.
To test the sensitivity of the estimated social welfare cost of FFS reform, Figure
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r Base run Low case High case
sePetrol=0.22 160,376 212,556 +32.54% 145,940 -9.00%
Value of smuggling sePetrol=0.1 55,919 25,869 -53.74% 72,264 +29.23%
outbound (+) sePetrol=0 -12,048 -1,203 -90.02% -27,116 +125.06%
and inbound (-) sePetrol=-0.1 -76,158 -48,018 -36.95% -94,089 +23.54%
sePetrol =-0.22 -154,739 -197,849 +27.86% -135,590 -12.38%
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis for smuggling parameter r. Absolute values represent
the total value of smuggled fuel (in mil Naira) in each case. Percentage values represent
the deviation of the low and high case estimates from the base run results.
Figure 20: Sensitivity to variation in r: Estimated change in the outbound (+) and
inbound (-) smuggling estimates (in mil Naira) at different subsidisation rates sePetrol.
21 presents the difference between the welfare costs in the illicit activities model
and the counter-factual (Section 9.9). Both the low and high cases highlight that
the variation in parameter r has no impact on the overall conclusion that illicit
activities (in this case smuggling) can play a key role in determining the welfare
cost of FFS reform. In both cases the welfare cost is about 40% lower when
illicit activities are considered.
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(a) Low case
(b) High case
Figure 21: The percentage difference between social welfare costs of FFS reform in
the model considering illicit activities, and a counter-factual (see Section 9.9). Due
to the lesser contribution of smuggling to this difference, the variation in r has little
effect on the overall conclusions.
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10.3. Tax evasion parameters Nfh,j and N
z
j
As part of its optimisation problem, the firm chooses the optimal level of factor
and production tax evasion (see equations 11 and 16). Besides the effective
tax rates (τfh,j and τ
z
j ), the choice of the optimal evasion rate is determined by
the parameters Nfh,j and N
z
j , which characterise the cost of evasion activities
(equations 1 and 2). The values of Nfh,j and N
z
j in the base run calibration
range between 8.01 and 9.02; thus the elasticities of tax evasion with respect to
the tax rate (expressed as 1/Nj) are between 0.11 and 0.13. These values are
in line with the elasticities used by Liu (2013).
As before, the low case considers 25% lower values for Nfh,j and N
z
j , while the
high case considers 25% higher values. Note that the parameters Afh,j and A
z
j
are calibrated on the basis of Nfh,j and N
z
j (Section 6.2). Thus no separate
sensitivity analysis is required for these. Table 4 reports the sensitivity of tax
evasion estimates with respect to variation in parameters Nfh,j and N
z
j .
Nfh,j Base run Low case High case
Total sePetrol=0.22 2,416,237 2,343,597 -3.01% 2,463,199 +1.94%
factor tax sePetrol=0 1,577,961 1,494,444 -5.29% 1,631,069 +3.37%
evasion sePetrol=-0.22 966,775 895,413 -7.38% 1,012,810 +4.76%
Nzj Base run Low case High case
Total sePetrol=0.22 2,078,998 2,078,724 -0.01% 2,079,238 +0.01%
production tax sePetrol=0 1,978,902 1,977,739 -0.06% 1,979,653 +0.04%
evasion sePetrol=-0.22 1,906,655 1,905,962 -0.04% 1,907,141 +0.03%
Table 4: Deviation from the base run estimates for low and high value cases for the
tax evasion parameters Nfh,j and N
z
j .
Figure 22 shows that the variation in parameters Nfh,j and N
z
j notably influ-
ences the level of tax evasion taking place, thus the associated evasion losses.
However, note that base run parameter values for illicit activities have been
chosen conservatively; i.e. the base run is likely to underestimate the role of tax
evasion.
With respect to the social welfare cost of FFS reform, the difference between the
illicit activities model and the counter-factual remains large regardless of the
value of Nfh,j and N
z
j . In the high value case, the social welfare cost of reform is
nearly 50% lower in the illicit activities model compared to the counter-factual.
Even in the low value case, the welfare cost is at least 30% lower compared to
the counter-factual. Thus, the overall conclusion remains unchanged that illicit
activities play a significant role in determining the welfare costs of reform.
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Figure 22: Percentage deviation of the social welfare cost of FFS reform to a variation
in parameters Nfh,j and N
z
j from the base run estimate (see Section 9.9); presented for
different subsidisation rates along the horizontal axis.
46
(a) Low case
(b) High case
Figure 23: The percentage difference between social welfare costs of FFS reform in
the illicit activities model and a counter-factual (see Section 9.9). (a) presents the
estimate for Nfh,j and N
z
j taking values 25% lower than in the base run (25% higher
in (b)).
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11. Conclusion
It is widely accepted that FFS incentivise rampant fuel smuggling to neighbour-
ing countries, meaning that a significant fraction of FFS benefits leaks out of the
country. In addition, labour taxes not only distort incentives to work, but are
associated with high evasion rates and incentivise informal economic activity.
This study makes the case that such illicit activities can play a key role in
determining the welfare costs and benefits of fiscal reform, in particular FFS
reform. It develops a CGE model for Nigeria to study the impact of FFS reform –
and energy taxes – on key economic parameters, including consumption, income
distribution, tax incidence, and fiscal efficiency. Throughout this analysis, the
study examines the role of tax evasion and fuel smuggling, and shows that these
factors can substantially strengthen the argument in favour of subsidy removal.
First, the study confirms several key observations made by the existing literature
on FFS reform and energy taxation:
• FFS are highly regressive, with the bottom income quintile receiving 1%
of total FFS payments and the top income quintile 75%.
• Removing FFS without compensation measures results in significant dis-
posable income shocks to households across all income levels.
• Removing FFS and redistributing revenues using uniform cash transfers
has a strong progressive (i.e. pro-poor) distributional effect. This progres-
sive distribution becomes even more pronounced when FFS are replaced
by fuel taxes.
• Removing FFS and using revenues to cut pre-existing labour taxes reduces
fiscal distortions and the associated welfare losses.
• Removing FFS causes significant structural shifts in consumption bundles,
with overall petrol consumption decreasing by over 19%. The simulated
fuel tax can extend this reduction to over 35%. In turn, households in-
crease their formal market consumption accordingly.
In addition, by considering the role of illicit activities, this study shows that
conventional analyses may be overlooking a significant part of the picture:
• Regardless of the method of revenue redistribution, reducing subsidies di-
minishes the incentives for fuel smuggling, and hence the welfare losses
associated with it. The reduction of these welfare losses must be consid-
ered when evaluating FFS reforms.
• In the case when revenues of FFS reform are redistributed using cash trans-
fers, avoided smuggling means that the cash transfer scheme is disbursing
the same aggregate benefit to the population as in the FFS scheme, but
at a lower cost.
• Reducing FFS and using revenues to lower pre-existing labour tax rates
not only mitigates labour market distortions, but reduces tax evasion; i.e.
the government can earn the same level of tax revenues, while charging
lower tax rates.
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• A conservative estimate for Nigeria is that taking into account illicit ac-
tivities can lower the welfare cost of FFS reform by up to 40%. The
tax evasion effect accounts for (on average) 75% of this difference, with
smuggling effects accounting for the remainder.
• The above mentioned benefits of FFS removal (i.e. in terms of income dis-
tribution, consumption, fiscal efficiency) can be increased when subsidies
are not only removed, but replaced by fuel taxes. Such fuel taxes may
reverse the direction of smuggling activities, though this is not enough to
undermine the overall benefits.
Even though tax evasion tends to be particularly high in developing countries
– large informal sectors are symptomatic for this – the “tax evasion effect” has
not been studied before in the context of FFS reform. Similarly, despite being
a frequently cited side-effect of FFS, smuggling has also received virtually no
attention in the literature so far. This study demonstrates that such illicit activ-
ities can make a significant difference to the argument in favour of FFS reform;
and should be considered when designing and implementing such reforms.
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